Aggleton & Brown argue that a hippocampal-anterior thalamic system supports the “recollection” of contextual information about previous events, and that a separate perirhinal-medial dorsal thalamic system supports detection of stimulus “familiarity.” Although there is a growing body of human literature that is in agreement with these claims, when recollection and familiarity have been examined in amnesics using the process dissociation or the remember/know procedures, the results do not seem to provide consistent support. We reexamine these studies and describe the results (...) of an additional experiment using a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) technique. The results of the reanalysis and the ROC experiment are consistent with Aggleton & Brown's proposal. Patients with damage to both regions exhibit severe deficits in recollection and smaller, but consistent, deficits in familiarity. (shrink)

In perception science, an alternative to focusing on individual sensory systems is to describe the environment to be perceived. We focus on the emergent dynamics of human-environment interactions as an important category of the environment to be perceived. We argue that information about such dynamics is available in subtle patterns of movement variability that, of necessity, stimulate multiple sensory systems.

Chez Saint-Simon, la substitution d'une réorganisation sociale et d'un autre rapport à la nature à l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme, de l'administration des choses au gouvernement des hommes, entre autres, ont pris corps théoriquement en partant de l'expérience plutôt que de 'raisonnements a priori' (Le Producteur, oct. 1825 - oct. 1826). De la lecture de ses Œuvres éditées pour la première fois en 2012 en Œuvres complètes émergent des liens entre action et pensée, corps et esprit. Le saint-simonisme (1825-1835) apparaît, (...) au lendemain de la Révolution de Juillet, comme un 'espace-temps' élargi aux prolétaires et aux femmes attirés par cette 'nouvelle et puissante doctrine', prêts à s'impliquer dans la pratique de ces liens et les discussions dramatiques entre les deux 'Pères', Bazard et Enfantin (sur la 'question de la femme', les rapports internes et externes - silence sur les émeutes des canuts lyonnais). Saint-Simon et le saint-simonisme ont été /sont des 'passe-frontières' entre les sexes, les cultures, les états (réciprocité des échanges avec la Toscane pré-unitaire et l'Allemagne des intellectuels post-hégeliens). À la promesse 'd'être sincères en tout', véritable leitmotiv du saint-simonisme, les 'prolétaires saint-simoniennes' ont répondu en créant un mouvement autonome où vivre leur désir de ne pas séparer cœur, corps et esprit, 'dans la foi religieuse qui nous donne la force de vaincre' (La femme libre, 1832) ; par la création de cette forme sociale-politique et l'audace de leur pensée, elles ont précédé les hommes ; leurs écrits et ceux de leurs proches (Cl. Démar, S. Voilquin) nous bouleversent encore. Des formes de créativité étonnamment populaires sont nées en Provence sur les décombres de la société d'ordre, telles les chansons provençales de V. Gelu à Marseille (1837-1855) et ses 'Notes biographiques' écrites en français (rééditées en partie à la fin XXe siècle), tel Le marquis des Saffras, roman du saint-simonien J. de la Madelène (1849) réédité plusieurs fois. Femmes et hommes se réfèrant au 'vrai', chez lesquels la totalité de l'être est engagée dans le sillage de Saint-Simon, n'inventent-ils pas le politique moderne à l'encontre des codes et des chartes fustigés par Cl. Démar (1833)? Le saint-simonisme n'a-t-il pas été la matrice de la sociologie avec la découverte du rapport à l'autre, dégagée du moralisme étouffant du 'Me siècle (S. Zweig), peut-être articulée à la naissance du féminisme? N'a-t-il pas généré une nouvelle manière de penser que la Ille République aurait tenté d'annihiler (imposition du positivisme comme philosophie centrale) et les prémices de la découverte freudienne?"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Bhartṛhari, the famous Indian linguistic philosopher (V CE) in his ‘Vākyapadīya’ discussed different doctrines on the nature of language, tending to demonstrate, that each of the doctrines is justified in a certain context and represents a certain aspect of reality. Modern scholars usually designate Bhartṛhari’s philosophy as perspectivism, though there are also disagreements with this interpretation. E.g. G. Cardona claims that Bhartṛhari’s perspectivism is generally exaggerated, and the true teaching expressed in VP is the monistic theory of the “Pāṇini-darśana”. So, (...) the concept of Bhartṛhari's perspectivism needs to be further eleborated. In this paper two characteristic features of Bhartṛhari’s perspectivism are discussed, in order to clarify the essence of his philosophical strategy: (1) Functional attitude; (2) Relative incompleteness of every single doctrine. These features elucidate the essence of Bhartṛhari's philosophical method and provide us with the key to the problem of the balance between monistic and pluralistic tendencies in the ‘Vākyapadīya’. (shrink)

I would like to stress Vadim Mikhailovich's [Mezhuev's] position and clarify our conversation about culturology. It is constantly repeated that culturology is a science. It is my profound conviction that culturology is not a science. Culturology is a distinctive phenomenon of Russian culture and represents a certain intellectual movement. If one briefly surveys the history of its emergence, its philosophical origin becomes obvious. This intellectual movement consists of three levels, if one takes into account the "-logy" ending. First, the philosophical (...) level, from which in the 1970s culture began to be conceived as a special field of knowledge in our country. Then, humanistic knowledge: a great many representatives of the humanities in Russia-historians, art specialists, art critics, essayists-studied culture. Finally, there is the socioscientific tendency, which is just beginning to form in Russia and carries the internationally accepted name of social and cultural anthropology. All of us are synergistically attracted to these three tendencies, which comprise what is called culturology. The question of how these three tendencies of knowledge are correlated in the framework of the given intellectual movement is, in my view, extremely important. For quite some time now, there has been no reflection in Russia on the foundations of scientific and philosophical knowledge, but such reflection is necessary. To advance along the road of rational knowledge it is important to reflect in what cognitive space we find ourselves, what we are doing within its boundaries, and for what reason. From this point of view, neither philosophers nor representatives of the humanities or the social sciences will renounce their positions of observer. Moreover, I agree with Mezhuev that there is no single philosophy, humanistic conception, or theory of culture. Anyone who is engaged professionally in the study of cultural phenomena can choose his initial foundations. As Vadim Mezhuev correctly notes, the significance of philosophy for other types of knowledge lies in the fact that there are borderline areas of man's existence in the world. However, they are identified in different ways by different philosophies: positivism, phenomenology, classical Platonism, Aristotelianism, Kantianism, and so forth. Representatives of humanistic and socioscientific knowledge are free to choose any metaphysics. Philosophers will continue to attend to their business in their subject area, and scientists in theirs. But it is important periodically to determine rationally when there must be close and complementary relations between the three components of this intellectual movement and when they must exist in parallel. Then questions such as who has priority and who is the guardian of truth will not arise. If the tendencies have diverged in parallel, then the representatives of each of them are occupied within their domains with questions which are irrelevant in other fields of knowledge or for other theoretical models. At the end of the twentieth century, to pose the question of scientism or antiscientism is senseless because today we know that there are different forms of rationality and that science is not the only, and is quite a narrow, form of rationality. Myth too is rational. It is expressed in categories and has a particular inner logic. We recognize myth as a rational cultural entity, because it is represented in symbolic form as an ordered sequence of judgments, as an artifact. But it differs from scientific theory. That is why it is fruitful to reflect on what forms of rationality are relevant to what levels of knowledge. I agree with Ogurtsov, who says that these forms penetrate in one way or another into every culturally institutionalized form of knowledge. Indeed, in philosophical knowledge there are elements of everyday, mythological, and scientific knowledge, but this does not negate the distinctive nature of the philosophical form of knowledge. In science there are elements of metaphysics, mythology, and everyday knowledge, but this does not cancel the particularities of the scientific form of knowledge. The same is true of the humanistic form, which is in principle irremovable from the framework of institutionalized knowledge, at least for now. I do not agree with Ogurtsov that I give the humanistic form of knowledge a negative evaluation. Humanistic knowledge begins to be significant in a period of a cognitive paradigm shift. This, we can say, is apparent today, at a time of transition from the grand style of modernism in its postmodern mode to the building of the foundations for a new whole. The point is that the humanistic form of knowledge enables us to isolate at the outset those areas of the unknown at which we arrive because of the limitations inherent in other forms of rationality. It is closest to everyday and empirical categories of knowledge and forms of ideas; hence, particularism, image syncretism, and mobility are its distinctive features. But without this humanistic level no further step is possible in either scientific or philosophical knowledge. The breakdown into these forms of knowledge- philosophical, humanistic, and scientific-may be primitive, but we have to start our reflection on the foundations of our cognitive relationship to our surroundings somewhere. The identification of the forms of knowledge makes it possible to draw the conclusion that, unlike philosophical and humanistic knowledge, socioscientific knowledge is modeled on the natural sciences. From this it becomes obvious that the distinctive features of the object of social sciences determine also the special nature of the categorial apparatus, operationalization, selection method, and information analysis. I do not insist that the model I suggest must be accepted. Other models can be constructed. But let us start with a simpler comparison of types of knowledge and later we shall differentiate them. I started from this level because in our culture such a division is apparent and generally accepted. There are the philosophical, humanistic, and scientific forms of knowledge. They are irreducible to one another, they perform entirely different functions in the knowledge of man's relationship to the environment, and express different views about how man lives in culture. I agree that philosophy is exactly existence in culture with a singling out of the limits of this existence. But representatives of humanistic and socioscientific knowledge also deal with existence in culture. What is important for the philosopher is the direction of knowledge from within to the outside; for the representative of humanistic knowledge it is the description of how he exists among a multitude of seemingly diverse and divergent artifacts and processes; and for the scientist it is the order of the philosophically and humanistically defined reality in order to control it the better. (shrink)

В первую книгу сборника включены исследования и материалы, посвященные творчеству Сергея Николаевича Дурылина - писателя, поэта, философа и богослова, и творчеству представителей русского культурного ренессанса первой трети XX века.